This paper examines the behavior of a multinational firm (MNF) under exchange rate uncertainty. The MNF has operations domiciled in the home country and in a foreign country. Each of these two operations produces a single homogeneous good to be sold in the home and foreign markets. To hedge the exchange rate risk, the MNF has access to an intertemporally unbiased currency futures market. All currency futures contracts are marked-to-market and thus require interim cash settlement of gains and losses. We impose a liquidity constraint on the MNF in that the MNF is forced to prematurely liquidate its futures position from which the interim loss exceeds a predetermined threshold level. If the MNF's utility function satisfies decreasing absolute risk aversion, we show that the MNF optimally opts for a short under-hedge. Furthermore, the MNF sells less (more) and produces more (less) in the foreign (home) country in response to the imposition of the liquidity constraint. 
Introduction
According to the Committee on Payments and Settlement Systems (1998), firms should take liquidity risk seriously when devising their risk management strategies. Jorion (2001) categorizes liquidity risk into asset liquidity risk and funding liquidity risk. The former refers to the risk that the liquidation value of the assets differs significantly from the prevailing mark-to-market value. The latter refers to the risk that payment obligations cannot be met due to inability to raise new funds. Even for firms that are technically solvent, liquidity risk can be fatal to them. Prominent examples include the case of Metallgesellschaft and the debacle of Long-Term Capital Management.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of liquidity risk on the behavior of a multinational firm (MNF) facing exchange rate uncertainty. To this end, we develop a two-period model of a risk-averse MNF that has operations domiciled in the home country and in a foreign country. Each of these two operations produces a single homogeneous good to be sold in the home and foreign markets. To hedge its exchange rate risk exposure, the MNF has access to an intertemporally unbiased currency futures market. All currency futures contracts are marked-to-market in that they require interim cash settlement of gains and losses. These ex-post funding needs due to the marking-to-market process create liquidity risk vis-à-vis the exchange rate risk. Following Lien (2003) and Wong (2004a Wong ( , 2004b , we impose a liquidity constraint on the MNF. Specifically, the MNF is forced to prematurely liquidate its futures position whenever the interim loss incurred from this position exceeds a predetermined threshold level.
In the presence of the liquidity constraint, we show that the MNF optimally opts for a short under-hedge if the MNF's preferences satisfy the reasonable behavioral property of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) . Under-hedging is called for to strike a balance between the extent of the exchange rate risk and that of the liquidity risk. This is consistent with the normal practice of partial hedging that most companies do not use financial derivatives to completely hedge their risk exposures (see Tufano, 1996; Bodnar, Hayt, & Marston, 1998) .
Owing to the presence of the liquidity constraint, sales in the foreign market are embedded with some residual exchange rate risk that cannot be eliminated. A risk premium is thus demanded by the MNF on its foreign sales. This creates a wedge between the marginal revenues in the home and foreign markets. As a result, the MNF with the DARA utility function sells less (more) and produces more (less) in the foreign (home) country in response to the imposition of the liquidity constraint. These adjustments in sales and outputs result in a lower expected global domestic profit accrued to and a lower expected utility level attainable by the MNF as compared to those in the absence of the liquidity constraint.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates a two-period model of a risk-averse MNF facing both exchange rate risk and liquidity risk. Section 3 derives the MNF's optimal hedging decision. Section 4 examines the impact of the liquidity constraint on the MNF's production and sales decisions. The final section concludes.
The model
Consider a two-period, three-date (indexed by t = 0, 1, and 2) model of a multinational firm (MNF) that has operations domiciled in the home country and in a foreign country.
Interest rates in both periods are known with certainty. We as such compound all cash flows to their future values at t = 2 throughout the paper.
The MNF's home operation produces a single homogeneous good, x H , according to a cost function, C H (x H ), denominated in the domestic currency. The MNF's foreign operation produces the same homogeneous good, x F , according to a cost function, C F (x F ), denominated in the foreign currency.
1 The two cost functions, C H (x H ) and C F (x F ), are assumed to be strictly increasing and convex.
At t = 2, the MNF sells y H units of its total output, x H + x F , in the home country and y F units in the foreign country, where y H + y F = x H + x F . The sales in the home market generate a revenue function, R H (y H ), denominated in the domestic currency, whereas the sales in the foreign market generate a revenue function, R F (y F ), denominated in the foreign currency. Both R H (y H ) and R F (y F ) are assumed to be strictly increasing and concave, indicating some monopoly power enjoyed by the MNF in the home and foreign markets.
The prevailing spot exchange rate at t = 2 of the domestic currency against the foreign currency,ẽ 2 , is not known ex ante. 2 To hedge its exposure to this exchange rate risk, the MNF can trade infinitely divisible contracts in a currency futures market at t = 0. Each of the currency futures contracts calls for delivery of f 0 units of the domestic currency per unit of the foreign currency at t = 2. Let z be the number of the currency futures contracts sold (purchased if negative) by the MNF at t = 0.
1 The assumption that the MNF's home and foreign operations produce the same homogeneous good is not crucial. In the case of differentiated goods, we wold have two-way trade between the home and foreign operations rather than one-way trade as in the model.
2 Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde ( ∼ ) while their realizations do not.
While the initial futures exchange rate, f 0 , is known, the futures exchange rate at t = 1,f 1 , is regarded as a positive random variable. Let φ(f 1 ) and Φ(f 1 ) be the known probability density function and cumulative distribution function off 1 , respectively, over support [f 1 , f 1 ], where 0 < f 1 < f 1 < ∞. Conditioned on the realized futures exchange rate at t = 1,f 1 = f 1 , the spot exchange rate at t = 2, which by convergence is also the futures exchange rate at t = 2, can be specified asẽ 2 = f 1 +ε, whereε is a random variable. To focus on the MNF's hedging motive, vis-à-vis its speculative motive, we assume that the currency futures market is intertemporally unbiased. That is, we set f 0 equal to the unconditional expected value ofẽ 2 and˜ equal to a zero-mean random variable conditionally independent off 1 , thereby rendering f 1 equal to the conditional expected value ofẽ 2 . Let ψ(ε) and Ψ(ε) be the known probability density function and cumulative distribution function ofε, respectively, over support [ε, ε] , where −f 1 < ε < 0 < ε < ∞.
All of the currency futures contracts are marked to market at the end of each period.
Thus, conditioned on the realized futures exchange rate at t = 1,f 1 = f 1 , the MNF enjoys a gain (or suffer a loss if negative) from its futures position, z, equal to (f 0 − f 1 )z at t = 1.
Following Lien (2003) and Wong (2004a Wong ( , 2004b , we impose a liquidity constraint on the MNF. Specifically, the MNF is forced to prematurely liquidate its futures position at t = 1 whenever the loss incurred at that time exceeds a predetermined threshold level, k, i.e.,
futures position at t = 1, implying that its random global profit at t = 2, denominated in the domestic currency, is given bỹ
On the other hand, if (f 1 − f 0 )z ≤ k, the MNF holds its futures position until t = 2 so that its random global domestic currency profit at t = 2 becomes
The MNF possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, U (Π), defined over its global domestic currency profit at t = 2, Π, with U (Π) > 0 and U (Π) < 0, indicating the presence of risk aversion. 3 Anticipating the liquidity constraint at t = 1, the MNF has to choose the levels of output in the home and foreign operations, x H and x F , the sales in the home and foreign markets, y H and y F , and the futures position, z, at t = 0 so as to maximize the expected utility of its random global domestic currency profit at t = 2, subject to the constraint that
In Appendix A, we show that it is optimal for the MNF to opt for a short futures position, i.e., z > 0. Thus, the MNF's ex-ante decision problem at t = 0 is given by
subject to x H + x F = y H + y F , where E ε (·) is the expectation operator with respect to Ψ(ε), andΠ L andΠ C are defined in equations (1) and (2), respectively.
Optimal hedging decision
Assuming an interior optimal solution and making use of the constraint that y F = x H + x F − y H , the first-order conditions for program (3) with respect to x H , x F , y H , and z are respectively given by 4
where we have used Leibniz's rule,
and an asterisk ( * ) indicates an optimal level.
As is well known in the literature, under multiple sources of risk, risk aversion alone is usually too weak to yield intuitively appealing results and decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) is called for (see Gollier, 2001 ). The MNF's utility function, U (Π), exhibits DARA if, and only if, the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, −U (Π)/U (Π), decreases with Π. 
Proof: See Appendix B.
To see the intuition of Proposition 1, we refer to equations (1) and (2). If the MNF faces no liquidity constraints, its random global domestic currency profit at t = 2 is delineated solely by equation (2). In this case, the full-hedging theorem of Danthine (1976) , Holthausen (1979), Feder, Just, and Schmitz (1980) , Broll and Zilcha (1992) , and Broll, Wong, and Zilcha (1999) applies in that setting z = R F (y F ) − C F (x F ) completely eliminates the exchange rate risk. In the presence of the liquidity constraint, however, such a full-hedge is no longer optimal due to the residual risk,ε[R F (y F )−C F (x F )], arising from the premature liquidation of the futures position at t = 1, as evident from equation (1). This creates an income effect because the presence of the liquidity risk reduces the attainable expected utility under risk aversion. To attain the former expected utility level (with no risk), the MNF has to be compensated with additional income. Taking away this compensation gives rise to the income effect (see Wong, 1997) . Under DARA, the MNF becomes more risk averse and thus is unwilling to take on the liquidity risk. The MNF as such shorts less of the currency futures contracts so as to shrink the interval, [f 0 + k/z, f 1 ], over which the premature liquidation of the futures position at t = 1 prevails. It is therefore optimal for the MNF to set z < R F (y F ) − C F (x F ) that strikes a balance between the extent of the exchange rate risk and that of the liquidity risk.
When k = ∞, the MNF's liquidity constraint never binds and a full-hedge is optimal.
When k is finite, the liquidity constraint is in effect with positive probability and an underhedge becomes optimal according to Proposition 1. Thus, the severity of the liquidity constraint, as gauged by the threshold, k, plays a pivotal role in shaping the MNF's optimal futures position, z * .
Tufano (1996) documents that in the gold mining industry only 17% of firms shed 40% or more of their price risk. Bodnar, Hayt, and Marston (1998) also find that most nonfinancial firms do not use financial derivatives to completely hedge their risk exposures. Such a normal practice of partial hedging may be due to the prevalence of liquidity constraints confronted by firms, as suggested by Proposition 1.
Optimal production and sales decisions
If the MNF faces no liquidity constraints, we know from Broll and Zilcha (1992) and Broll, Wong, and Zilcha (1999) that the separation theorem of Danthine (1976 ), Holthausen (1979 , and Feder, Just, and Schmitz (1980) holds. Specifically, the optimal sales and outputs in this case are given by
where a nought ( 0 ) indicates an optimal level in the absence of the liquidity constraint. 
Proof: See Appendix C. 2
To see the intuition of Proposition 2, we refer to equations (1) and (2). If the MNF faces no liquidity constraints, its random global domestic currency profit at t = 2 is given by equation (2) only. In this case, the MNF could have completely eliminated its exposure to the exchange rate risk had it chosen z = R F (y F ) − C F (y F ) within its own discretion. Alternatively put, the degree of exchange rate risk exposure to be assumed by the MNF should be totally unrelated to its sales and production decisions. The optimal sales and outputs are then chosen to maximize
, thereby yielding equations (10), (11), and (12). Equations (10) and (11) state that the MNF equates the marginal revenues to the marginal costs in both the home and foreign markets, respectively.
Furthermore, equation (12) reveals that the marginal revenue in the home market is equal to the expected marginal revenue in the foreign market, both of which are denominated in the domestic currency. This is the celebrated separation theorem of Danthine (1978) , Holthausen (1979) , and Feder, Just, and Schmitz (1980) .
In the presence of the liquidity constraint, setting z = R F (y F )−C F (x F ) cannot eliminate all the exchange rate risk due to the residual risk,ε[R F (y F ) − C F (x F )], arising from the premature liquidation of the futures position at t = 1. Such residual risk, however, can be controlled by varying the levels of output and sales. Equations (20) and (21) state that it remains optimal for the MNF to equate the marginal revenues to the marginal costs in both the home and foreign markets, respectively. However, equation (22) implies that the marginal revenue in the home market is strictly less than the expected marginal revenue in the foreign market, both of which are denominated in the domestic currency. Since the sales in the foreign market are embedded with some exchange rate risk that cannot be eliminated due to the liquidity constraint, the MNF has to demand a risk premium to compensate for its foreign sales. The wedge between the two marginal revenues in the home and foreign markets is de facto the risk premium required by the MNF. The MNF as such sells less (more) and produces more (less) in the foreign (home) country. This is in line with the findings of Broll and Zilcha (1992) and Broll, Wong, and Zilcha (1999) .
In the absence of the liquidity constraint, the MNF optimally adopts a full-hedge that eliminates all the exchange rate risk. The MNF then chooses its sales and outputs so as to maximize its expected global domestic currency profit at t = 2. In the presence of the liquidity constraint, the MNF adjusts its sales and outputs according to Proposition 2 by selling less (more) and producing more (less) in the foreign (home) country. This must imply the MNF's expected global domestic currency profit at t = 2 be adversely affected in face of the liquidity risk. Given risk aversion, the MNF's expected utility must also be lowered. Thus, the presence of the liquidity constraint unambiguously makes the MNF strictly worse off regarding to both its profit and utility levels.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the behavior of a risk-averse multinational firm (MNF) under exchange rate uncertainty. The MNF has operations domiciled in the home country and in a foreign country. Each of these two operations produces a single homogeneous good to be sold in the home and foreign markets. To hedge its exchange rate exposure, the MNF has access to an intertemporally unbiased currency futures market. All currency futures contracts are marked-to-market and thus require interim cash settlement of gains and losses.
These ex-post funding needs due to the marking-to-market process create liquidity risk vis-à-vis the exchange rate risk. As in Lien (2003) and Wong (2004a Wong ( , 2004b , the MNF is liquidity constrained in that it is forced to prematurely liquidate its futures position whenever the interim loss incurred from this position exceeds a predetermined threshold level.
Within our context, we have shown that the MNF optimally opts for a short underhedge should the MNF's preferences satisfy decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). We have further shown that the MNF with the DARA utility function sells less (more) and produces more (less) in the foreign (home) country in response to the imposition of the liquidity constraint. The liquidity risk created by the interim funding requirement of a futures hedge thus bestows perverse incentives on the MNF regarding to its hedging and production decisions. These result in a lower expected global domestic profit accrued to and a lower expected utility level attainable by the MNF as compared to those in the absence of the liquidity constraint, thereby making the MNF strictly worse off.
Appendix B
Let EU be the objective function in program (3). Partially differentiating EU with respect to z and evaluating the resulting derivative at
where we have used Leibniz's rule, and
If the right-hand side of equation (16) is negative (positive), it follows from equation (7) and the second-order conditions for program (3) that z
Since E ε (ε) = 0 and f 0 is set equal to the expected value off 1 with respect to Φ(f 1 ), we can write equation (16) as
Since E ε (ε) = 0, it follows from equations (17) and (18), risk aversion, and Jensen's in-
and thus the second term on the right-hand side of equation (19) is unambiguously negative. Since U (Π) exhibits DARA, we have U (Π) ≥ 0.
It follows from E ε (ε) = 0, equations (17) and (18), and Jensen's inequality that
. Thus, the first term on the right-hand side of equation (19) is also unambiguously negative, implying that z
Appendix C
Substituting equation (6) into equation (4) yields
Substituting equation (7) into equation (6) yields
where Θ is defined by R F (y * F ) times
Since E ε (ε) = 0, it follows from equation (1) and risk aversion that
Thus, the second term in the numerator of expression (23) is unambiguously positive. The first term in the numerator of expression (23) has the same sign as
From Proposition 1, we know that 0 < z 
. Thus, we can write
Likewise, let G(Π * C0 ) be the cumulative distribution function ofΠ * C0 . Using the change-
Subtracting equation (25) by equation (24) yields
which follows from the fact that dG(X) = 0 for all
Consider the function, T (X) = T (M + εQ) = 0 and T (X) is first increasing and then decreasing in X, it must be true that T (X) > 0 for all X ∈ (M + εQ, M + εQ). In other words, F (X) is a mean preserving spread of G(X) in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) . According to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) , the right-hand side of equation (26) is unambiguously positive given risk aversion and thus Θ > 0.
Suppose that x * H ≥ x 0 H . Equations (10) and (20) imply that y * H ≤ y 0 H . It then follows from Θ > 0 and equations (12) and (22) (11) and (21) imply that y * F ≥ y 0 F . It then follows from Θ > 0 and equations (12) and (22) that y * H > y 0 H . Equations (10) and (20) thus imply that x * H < x 0 H . Since y * H > y 0 H , y * F ≥ y 0 F , and x * H < x 0 H , it must be true that x * F > x 0 F , a contradiction. Hence, we conclude that x * H < x 0 H and x * F > x 0 
